Peter Gould's Fire in the Rain not only tells the story behind the Chernobyl accident (which he has written in an informative, scientifically demystified, and most absorbing style) but also raises a number of keenly perceptive questions about the extent to which the dissemination, manipulation, and suppression of information about the accident and its effects may have been influenced by myriad politico-economic considerations, and, perhaps most significantly, by the degree to which a country is dependent upon atomic power. Gould, who, during the research for this book, covered well over five thousand pages of official reports, eyewitness statements, scientific treatises, and media accounts, convincingly tries to capture this important correlation between a nation's dependency upon atomic power and the degree to which information about the Chernobyl accident and its effects was manipulated or suppressed for no less than 26 West and East European countries (pp. 112-19). At minimum, the nuclear accident at Chernobyl created its own complex information crisis from which all nations can and must learn, and Gould's examination of the range of governmental reactions and responsesespecially how and when information was made public in both Eastern and Western Europe-is impressive and instructive.
Grigori Medvedev's Truth about Chernobyl also tells the story leading up to the accident and its subsequent cover-up. Medvedev was chief engineer at Chernobyl when it was being constructed during the 1970s and at the time of the 1986 accident was deputy director of the Central Directorate for Power Station Construction in Moscow (a department of the Ministry of Energy), where he was in charge of construction at nuclear power stations. Within days of the accident, Medvedev returned to Chernobyl to investigate the magnitude of the disaster officially.
The Truth about Chernobyl is an engrossing and masterfully written account based upon interviews with the directors, engineers and others who worked at the plant, the firefighters and helicopter pilots who valiantly tried to extinguish the fire, eyewitnesses to the explosion, the doctors and nurses who treated radiation victims and risked their lives to save others, and many key people who died from radiation within weeks of the accident. Medvedev Among the most important lessons of Chernobyl is the question it raises about how governmental bureaucracies, politicians, and scientists (whatever their political or ideological suasion) manage an atomic or ecological crisis that knows no political or ideological boundary. Both works also raise a number of questions essential to the future of nuclear energy throughout the world: Who should be involved in making decisions regarding the development of atomic power, the location and construction of nuclear power stations, and the disposal of radioactive waste? In sum, who should define the issues and make the decisions that will, without doubt, have an impact upon the delicate balance among the physical, living, and human worlds? And whatever direction the development of nuclear power takes in the future, Andrei Sakharov (himself an advocate of nuclear energy) warns us, we must not leave the answers to these crucial issues solely to technical experts-still less to bureaucrats (p. viii).
In sum, both Fire in the Rain and The Truth about Chernobyl are excellently written works of gripping detail that are, without question, of essential benefit to anyone interested in the history of nuclear power development in the Soviet Union, the way nuclear crises and information about such crises are managed (or mismanaged), the impact the accident had upon the countries affected by Chernobyl's radioactive fallout, the lessons and democratic consequences of the world's worst nuclear disaster, and the future of atomic energy in both the Soviet Union and abroad. Gupta then employs calculus to show the marginal conditions that must be satisfied for participation to be rational. These are used to develop models of likely cycles of violence in systems with specific parameters. Some of these are later estimated with the data. In the arguments that flow from the model, it would appear that the author had an eye toward asking questions regarding the current U.S. experience, namely, considerable continued deprivation for our minorities and yet relative absence of serious political violence. But these questions are not developed in the book as it moves to an aggregate political economy level to investigate the effect of violence on economic growth.
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Data from 1948 to 1952 from the New York Times are presented for 104 countries, but a far more restricted subset of years is statistically manipulated to do the data analysis. The analysis is quite broad and includes simulations of income redistribution patterns to generate economic growth, the prediction of political violence in countries, the loss of income attributable to instability, and so on. The data analysis is extraordinarily interesting, even when some of the results are only marginally significant, and others not surprising. The program of statistically testing a micro behavior hypothesis with macro system data is problematic, but, at least, the author seems aware of the pitfalls. The limitations of the results are reflected in the relative thinness of the policy conclusions.
These disappointingly thin levels of significance can be looked at in at least one very positive light. Given the strength of development of the approach and the statistics developed, students of political economy, political violence, and political stability have been given food for thought that should serve them in good stead for the development of the next generation of studies on these subjects. And if these students' tastes do not lead them to begin with the material presented in this book, they are likely to be embarrassed by their critics. 
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